February 5, 1969

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111900.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: JCS Paper, "Air Reconnaissance"

The attached JCS working paper was given to us by Major Stewart, AFXOP, who requested our comments to assist him in preparing an Air Staff position. The paper was to go to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for discussion on February 7.

This morning, General Berg had an opportunity to discuss this paper briefly with General Ralph Steakley, JRC. It appears that President Nixon desires to demonstrate to the Chinese Communists that the U.S. is deeply concerned over the Chinese interaction with North Vietnamese sources. One method of demonstrating this concern in practical form is to do some overflight of South China. Interestingly, the primary purpose of overflight would not be to acquire intelligence; rather, the primary purpose is to "show the flag" and make a psychological impression on the Chinese. General Steakley pointed out that the information he was giving us was extremely sensitive and that he had been directed -- by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- to prepare a paper for the Secretary of Defense commenting on the U.S. capability to carry out such an aerial demonstration. General Steakley assured General Berg that any overflights of denied area conducted as a result of this initiative would be handled in the approved manner, i.e., as NRO-managed activities.

On the basis of these comments, we find only one serious problem in the paper. This occurs on page 5, paragraph 6, which reads:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the immediate resumption of aerial reconnaissance over South China be approved and they be authorized to employ any one or all three systems at their discretion.

bandle via BYEMAM control system

I was relieved to learn from Major Stewart that at an action officers' meeting this morning the sentence had been changed, by unanimous consent, to read as follows:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the immediate resumption of aerial reconnaissance over South China, and that authority be obtained to employ any one or all three systems.

PAUL E. WORTHMAN Colonel, USAF

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APPENDED DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL

AIR RECONNAISSANCE

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APPENDED DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL

WORKING PAPER

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ENCLOSURE	1
MEMORANDUM BY THE J-3	2
for the	3
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	4
on	5
AIR RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS (U)	<u>6</u>
1. Problem. To provide the Secretary of Defense with	2
comments on the requirement for and capability to conduct	8
	<u>9</u>
2. Information. Drone reconnaissance of South China was	<u>10</u>
initiated in August 1964 and continued until 27 March 1968	
when all overhead aerial reconnaissance of China was suspended	12
at the request of the Secretary of State.	13
a. Photographic satellites have provided the only overhead	14
coverage of China since 27 March 1968.	15
b. Reconnaissance vehicles considered for overflight of	16
China are, the SR-71, 147 H/T and TAGBOARD drones. The	17
first two are operational and the TAGBOARD is in the final	<u>, 18</u>
phase of developmental testing. It is estimated that the 1	<u>19</u>
TAGBOARD will be operational during the first quarter of	20
FY 1970.	21
3. Discussion. Reconnoitering targets such as lines of	22
communication, transportation centers, airfields used by NVN	23
aircraft and port facilities in the area of South China that	
is contiguous to Laos and North Vietnam would indicate US	25

concern over CHICOM involvement in the Vietnam War. In 26 addition the intelligence data base would be increased and/or 27 up dated. 28

a. The survivability of the SR-71 and 147 drones has 29 been demonstrated over NVN. SR-71 is near 100% survivable 30 while the 147 drone is approximately 70%. Over South 31

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·	China it is estimated that the 147 drone would approach $\frac{1}{2}$
	an 80% survivability figure. $\frac{2}{2}$
	b. The TAGBOARD drone is a new vehicle that has not 3
•	been employed before, however its performance characteristics $\frac{4}{2}$
	are equal or superior to the SR-71. Its survivability
	should be near 100%. $\underline{6}$
	c. Reconnoitering the area of South China contiguous
	to Laos and North Vietnam would indicate US concern over 8
	CHICOM involvement in the Vietnam War and in addition would <u>9</u>
	provide valuable intelligence data on CHICOM military <u>10</u>
	capabilities in that area.
	d. Each of the vehicles considered have unique advantages and 12
	that could be exploited in South China. Unless political
ана 1911 г.	consideration dictate otherwise all three vehicles should 14
	be used.
	e. For further Discussion see Annex to the Appendix. <u>16</u>
	4. Recommended Actions. It is recommended that: <u>17</u>
-	a. The memorandum in the Appendix, be forwarded to 18
-	the Secretary of Defense. 19
	b. This paper NOT be forwarded to the commanders of 20
	unified and specified commands.
	c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned, 22
	to NATO activities.
	d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US
	Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.
	5. Coordination. Time limitations precluded formal Service 26
	coordination. 27
	Action Officers: 28
	Joint Reconnaissance Center, J-3
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APPENDIX DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Air Reconnais sance of South China (TS)

1. (TS/B) On 27 March 1968 all overhead aerial reconnaissance of China was suspended at/the request of the Secretary of State. 7 Since that time photographic satellites have provided the only coverage of Chiná.

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2. (TS/B) Reconnoitering targets such as lines of communications 2 transportation centers, port facilities and airfields used by ______10 North Vietnamese aircraft, in the area of South China contiguous ----- 11 to Laos and North Vietnam would serve to indicate United States _____12 concern over Chinese involvement in the Vietnam War. In addition $\frac{13}{13}$ to indicating United States concern valuable intelligence on 14 Chinese Communist military capabilities would be obtained.

16 3. (TS/BT) The three vehicles considered for overflight of South China are, the SR-71, 147 H/T and TAGBOARD drones. All · <u>17</u> of these vehicles operate at high altitudes. The SR-71 and 18 147 H/T drones are operational and the TAGBOARD is in the final <u>19</u> 20 phase of developmental testing. It is estimated that the 21 TAGBOARD will be operational during the first quarter of - 22 FY 1970.

23 4. (TS) Each vehicle has unique advantages that could be exploited in South China, unless political considerations dictate - 24 26 authorized over South China. 27

> GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY/TAGBOARD Appendix

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	5. (U) The Annex hereto contains an assessment of the	\]
	air defense environment, performance characteristics of the	jana Narina (- A
•	vehicles considered and an assessment of the advantages and	
	disadvantages of each.	5
	6. (TS/B) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend \overline{Ehat} the	10 11 S
	immediate resumption of aerial reconnaissance over South China,	É
	be approved and they be authorized to employ any one or all thr	ee
•	systems (at their discretion.)	{ } }
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ANNEX

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

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INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

1. (TS) The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) approved intelligence requirement for high resolution photography in 5 South China is figentified by reference to the DIA Imagery Reconnaissance Objectives List (IROL). This objectives list is brought up-to-date each week, and is shown under the DOD column of the IROL.

10 2. (TS) The USIB approved objectives list includes those 11 targets which are most likely to provide evidence of increased 12 capability of the Chinese Communist combat forces to enter the war in Southeast Asia. These targets include key airfields, naval $\frac{13}{13}$ 14 facilities, military installations, supply depots, complexes, 15 and other objectives which can provide indication of buildup 16 or movement of forces toward Vietnam. Of particular interest 17 are those objectives located along the main rail lines from 18 Kunming to Lao Cai, and from Nanning to Dong Dang. 19 EXPECTED REACTIONS

3. (TS/C) Previous overflights of China have resulted in 20 <u>21</u> aggressive reactions by both radar monitoring and by weapons 22 • systems. Past experience with drone overflights has resulted 23 in some drone losses. Experience with manned overflights is limited, however there have been instances in which aircraft $\frac{24}{24}$ 25 have been shot down. The recent reports of Chinese Communist 26 attempts to use the "zoom climb" technique in intercepting 27 aircraft serve to reinforce the possibility that even those 28 vehicles operating at very high altitude and at high speed 29 will be subject to attempted intercept. In summary, it 30 is expected that high altitude reconnaissance overflights will be observed by the Chinese and that they will probably generate 31 SAM and fighter hostile reactions. 32

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY/TAGBOARD Annex

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4. (TS) Based on our experience over North Vietnam the threat $\frac{1}{2}$
to the SR-71 and TAGBOARD is virtually nil. It destinated that 2
the 147 H/T drones penetrating the Chinese defenses at 70,000 $\left\langle \frac{3}{2} \right\rangle$
feet or above will have an 80% probability of survival.
PERFORMANCE FIGURES
5. (TS/B) <u>6</u>
147 H/T SR-71 TAGBOARD Z
SPEED 430K 1830K 1860K <u>8</u>
ALTITUDE 70-72* 79-83 80-95
RANGE \$200 3050 3600 <u>10</u>
RESOLUTION 2.5' feet 2.5' feet 11
SWATH WIDTH 20 NM 30 NM 28
NAV ACC 8 NM/hr .6 NM/hr 1.5 NM/hr 13
TURN RADIUS 10 NM 90 NM 92 NM 14
MANNED No Yes (2) No 15
PROBABILITY OF 80% Near 100% Near 100% 16
SURVIVING A MISSION
COST/SORTIE \$86,000 \$70,000 \$2,400,000 18
* Altitude [1s based on a mission length of 1000-1200 NM] 19
147 H/T DRONE 20
6. (TS) Overflight of South China by the 147 drones would 21
· be conducted from the present operating locations in South . 22
Vietnam. The $^{P}_{\Lambda}$ C-130 launch aircraft operating from Bein Hoa $\frac{23}{23}$
Air Base, South Vietnam would launch drones from over Laos, Gulf
of Tonkin and South China Sea. / The drones would be recovered in $\frac{25}{1000000000000000000000000000000000000$
the Danang area. A typical 147 drone route is at Tab 1. $\frac{26}{147}$
7. (TS/B) The 147 drone is the least survivable of the $\frac{27}{27}$
three vehicles considered, (80% probability of surviving a 28
mission); however, it should be noted that drones of this type
were lost over South China during the 1964-1968 operations 30

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without creating significant political/diplomatic incidents.

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SECRET/HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY/TAGBOARD

8. (TS) The major advantages of the 147 drone is the unmanned $\frac{1}{2}$ feature and the flexibility of the system. Its slower speed and $\frac{2}{2}$ smaller turning radius permits operations within a confined area. 3

9. (S) The cost per sortie (approximately \$86,000) compares favorable with the SR-71.

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<u>6</u>

SR-71

10. (TS/B) Overflight of China by the SR-71 would be conducted 7 Penetrations of China would be accomplished from Laos, North 9 Vietnam, Gulf of Tonkin and South China Sea. & typical SR-71 routes is at Tab 2. 11

12 11. (TS/B) The probability of an SR-71 being lost to the 13 present Chinese Air Defense system is minimal. However, the political implications of the two/crew members falling into Chinese 14 <u>15</u> hands should be considered.

16 12. (TS) The super-sonic speed and sophistication of the turning radius which restricts the SR-71 from operating within 18 19 a confined area.

13. (TS) Based on a 100% probability of surviving a mission 20 the SR-71 is the least costly vehicle at \$70,000 per sortie. <u>22</u> . TAGBOARD

14. (TS/B) Overflight of South China by the TAGBOARD drone 23 would be conducted from Beale Air Force Base, California. The 24 B-52 launch aircraft operating on a round robin bases from $\frac{25}{25}$ Beale will launch the TAGBOARD drone well outside of all radar nets. The "package" will be recovered by JC-130 aircraft operating from Kadena Air Base, Okinawa. A typical 29 TAGBOARD route is at Tab 3.


15. (TS/B) The probability of the TAGBOARD drone being downed 30 by the present Chinese Air Defense system is minimal.


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TOP SECRET/HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY/TAGBOARD

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16. (TS/B) The sophistication of the TAGBOARD requires launch	ing 1
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from its home base which limits its <u>flexibility</u>	
17. (TS/ B) Based on a 100% probability of surviving a	:
mission the TAGBOARD is the most expensive vehicle. At the	4
termination of a mission, in a predetermined recovery area, the	
camera, magazine, inertial navigation system and computer,	. 6
stabilization system and other high-value components are	<u>7</u>
jettisoned from the drone and are recovered by JC-130 aircraft.	8
Pyrotechnic devices installed aboard the drone are used to	. <u>9</u>
destroy the vehicle automatically at the completion of the	10
mission after the sensor package has been ejected or if the	<u> </u>
drone descends through a pre-set altitude at any time during	<u>12</u>
the operational portion of the mission. This feature precludes	<u>13</u>
recovery of the vehicle after it is launched.	<u>14</u>
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Tab 2 Annex

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
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
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